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THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT: THE




SPACE IS NO longer the sole domain of governments.
Private enterprise has discovered that a dollar can be
made in outer space. Although private enterprise within
the United States has moved into space activities such as
telecommunications and materials processing, only the
government has provided transportation into space.'
This is changing, however, because the United States gov-
ernment is in the process of withdrawing from the com-
mercial space transportation market. As private
enterprise steps into the void left by the government's
withdrawal, the legal and regulatory regime which will
govern private space transportation services will become
very important. This article will explore and evaluate the
legal regime created by the Commercial Space Launch
Act (Act)2 and faced by potential United States transpor-
tation providers.
Before examining the existing legal regime, this article
will examine the business potential for space transporta-
* Michael S. Straubel, Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School
of Law. B.S. 1979, Western Michigan University;J.D. 1982, Marquette University
School of Law; Diploma in Air and Space Law 1985, McGill University Institute of
Air and Space Law.
Copyright reserved by Michael S. Straubel.
I The French company Arianespace is the only nongovernment organization
presently capable of providing launch services.
2 Commercial Space Launch Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2623 (Supp. 1984).
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tion and the need for regulation. The United States has
been, and to a large extent still is, dominating commercial
launch services and space activity. Recently, though,
China,3 Japan,4 the Soviet Union,5 and France, through
the French company, Arianespace,8 have demonstrated
marketable launch capabilities. This internationalization
of launch capabilities has added many variables to the
business climate for launch services. With government-
backed competitors in the field, factors such as national
prestige, military considerations, and the acquisition of
foreign capital have become important. These factors can
lead a government to subsidize its launch charges.7
Therefore, the international nature of the launch service
business will make the going rough for new private launch
companies without government backing.
Within the United States, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) has had a lock on the mar-
ket because competitors have been unable to match the
prices charged by NASA.8 NASA's stranglehold on the
Witt, Earth-bound U.S. Firm Sees China as Only Hope, Chi. Tribune, May 13,
1986, at 3, col. 5. China has recently begun negotiating with potential launch
customers. Teresat, Inc. and China have signed a memorandum of agreement for
the launch of two satellites on the Chinese Long March-3 rocket. The launches
are to take place some time in late 1987. Id
4 H-i ProvesJapanese Launch Capability, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 25, 1986,
at 25.
Marsh, Russia May Use Jardine in Satellite-Launch Deals, Financial Times,
(London) Oct. 20, 1986, at 1, col. 3. The Soviet Union has approached a Hong
Kong based trading company about marketing the Soviet's Proton rocket for com-
mercial launches. Though the Soviet Union can likely offer United States tele-
communication companies launch services cheaper than its Western competition,
United States technology transfer regulations may prevent shipment of sophisti-
cated American made satellites to the Soviet Union. Id
6 See Ford Urges Federal Intervention in Launch Insurance Market, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 25, 1986, at 25. Arianespace has provided launch services since 1979.
See id.
7 On May 25, 1984, Transpace Carriers, Inc. filed a petition with the Office of
the United States Representative alleging that the European Space Agency and
Arianespace had engaged in predatory pricing in the marketing of launch services.
The petition was eventually denied by President Reagan. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION ON FEDERAL IM-
PEDIMENTS TO DEVELOPMENT OF A PRIVATE COMMERCIAL LAUNCH INDUSTRY 10-12
(July, 1985)[hereinafter THE DOT REPORT].
. See The Center of Space Policy, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., COMMERCIAL SPACE
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market, however, is about to end. The Reagan Adminis-
tration, as a result of its critique of the United States'
space program following the shuttle Challenger accident,
decided to limit NASA's commercial launch activity. On
August 15, 1986, President Reagan announced that
NASA will no longer be in the business of launching pri-
vate satellites... NASA and our shuttles can't be commit-
ting their scarce resources to things which can be done
better and cheaper by the private sector. Instead, NASA
and the four shuttles should be dedicated to payloads im-
portant to national security and foreign policy, and even
more, on exploration, pioneering and developing new
technologies and uses of space.9
While the redirection of the shuttle program holds
great promise for the commercial expendable launch ve-
hicle (ELV)' 0 industry, many uncertainties in the Adminis-
tration's policy are causing great concern. First, the
shuttle program is not completely out of the launching
business. NASA is not required to cancel any of the forty-
four launch contracts entered into before the Challenger
accident. The shuttle is scheduled to perform fifteen of
the launch contracts through 1992.11 Second, the shuttle
will continue to launch payloads with foreign policy impli-
cations 12 and shuttle-unique payloads.13 These loopholes
in the plan for the shuttle's future commercial use make
INDUSTRY IN THE YEAR 2000: A MARKET FORECAST 136 (June 1985) [hereinafter A
Market Forecast]. For an explanation of NASA's pricing policies, see THE DOT
REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10.
9 Foley, Reagan Bars Shuttle From Competing For New Satellite Launch Contracts, Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 25, 1986, at 22.
10 An expendable launch vehicle is a non-reusable unmanned rocket used to
put a payload (usually a communication satellite) into earth orbit.
,1 Foley, supra note 9, at 22.
12 Id. Such payloads, which are already under contract, might include two In-
marsat satellites, two Indian Insats, Indonesia's Palapa B3, and two British Skynet
4 military communication satellites. See Shuttle Payloads, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 25, 1986, at 25.
"s Foley, supra note-9, at 22. A West German Spacelab might be a shuttle-
unique payload. NASA and the Economic Policy Council, a cabinet-level organi-
zation, are drafting a priority list for the launch of the forty-four launch contracts.
Id at 23.
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market assessment difficult for potential ELV manufactur-
ers and marketers.
Among the other problems facing the development of a
private launch industry,' 4 the absence of a guaranteed
market is the greatest impediment to the future develop-
ment of the industry within the United States. The costs
of developing a launch vehicle and establishing an assem-
bly line are so great that finding a guaranteed buyer for a
significant number of vehicles is necessary to recover the
invested capital. Since the shuttle became NASA and the
military's primary means of space transportation, except
for Martin Marietta's Titan program, ELV production
lines have remained dormant.' 5 Presently, only the Air
Force's search for a medium launch vehicle (MLV)
promises a guaranteed market for an ELV manufacturer.1 6
The winner of the Air Force's contract for MLV produc-
tion will probably emerge as the dominant (if not sole)
private launcher of commercial payloads.
Despite all of the uncertainties, the aerospace industry
is gearing up to enter the private space transportation
market. Martin Marietta, manufacturers of the Titan
launch vehicle, has spoken with organizations needing to
launch twenty-five communication satellites.' 7 If some
predictions are correct, commercial space transportation
activity will become extensive.' 8 With this possibility, the
" The other problems facing the development of a private ELV industry in-
dude a potential slump in launch demand (fewer satellites to be launched) and
difficulties obtaining launch insurance. See, Lowndes, Shuttle Decision Fails to Allay
Satellite Business Confusion, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 25, 1986, at 25 (discuss-
ing a potential slump in launch demand); Ford Urges Federal Intervention in Launch
Insurance Market, supra note 6, at 24.
a See Foley, supra note 9. at 22.
10 Air Force Selects MLV Contractors, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 18, 1986, at
22.
17 Covault, Martin Seeks Commercial Titan Launch Customers, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 25, 1976, at 24.
ise The Center for Space Policy predicts a high of $2.4 billion in revenues by the
year 2000. A Market Forecast, supra note 8, at 150. The phrase "space transpor-
tation" is used because it is quite possible that a shuttle or two will be privately
operated by the year 2000.
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matter of regulating the transportation industry becomes
increasingly important.
The United States government has recently taken an in-
terest in regulating and managing nongovernmental
space transportation to ensure public safety, compliance
with international obligations, and national security, and
to pursue foreign policy objectives.' 9 While the govern-
ment's interest has been less than organized, the enact-
ment of the Commercial Space Launch Act in 1984
marked the beginning of a sound policy toward space
transportation regulation and management.
I. REGULATION PRIOR TO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE
LAUNCH ACT
Before the enactment of the Commercial Space Launch
Act, three launch permission requests had been filed with
the government. Two of the planned missions resulted in
launches, and the third exploded during an engine test
firing. Space Services Incorporated of America, a Hous-
ton-based company headed by former Mercury astronaut
Donald (Deke) Slayton, has twice sought launch permis-
sion. In 1981 Space Services sought permission to launch
the liquid-fueled Percheron rocket.20 As part of the
launch permission process, Space Services obtained a
waiver of applicable Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) regulations for the launch of unmanned rockets. 2'
In exchange for the waiver of its regulations, the FAA re-
quired that the rocket land within United States territorial
water.2 Unfortunately, before the launch could take
place, a valve failed to open during an engine test, and the
1' For a review of the international obligations created by the Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the other four space treaties,
see Brumberg, Regulating Private Space Transportation, 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 363
(1984).
-Jacobs, A Private Enterpriser joins the Space Race, INDUSTRY WEEK, Nov. 29,
1982, at 52.
21 E. FINCH & A. MOORE, AsTROBUSINESS: A GUIDE TO THE COMMERCE AND LAW
oF OUTER SPACE 62 (1985) [hereinafter FINCH & MOORE].
2 Dula, Private Sector Activities in Outer Space, 19 INr'L LAw. 159, 180-81 (1985).
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liquid fuel (kerosene and gunpowder) exploded, destroy-
ing the rocket on the launch pad.28
Space Services' second launch was more successful. On
September 9, 1982, Space Services launched the Cones-
toga I from a makeshift launch pad on Matagorda Island
off the Texas Gulf Coast.24 In ten minutes the rocket trav-
eled over 300 miles downrange into international
waters.25
Although the FAA and other government agencies co-
operated with Space Services, the company had to deal
with many unknowns when seeking launch approval.
Neither one agency nor one set of rules existed to deter-
mine the procedures necessary to obtain launch approval.
Specifically, for its Conestoga launch, Space Services had
to obtain permission from three different federal agen-
cies.26 The FAA waived the regulations governing subor-
bital launches2 7 and issued an order designating the
airspace above Matagorda as temporarily restricted. 8
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued
Space Services an experimental radio license which al-
lowed the use of frequencies on a nonexclusive and tem-
porary basis.29  Furthermore, though of questionable
applicability, the Department of State issued an export li-
cense under the authority of the Arms Export Control
Act. 0 The Department of State's primary reason for re-
23 Jacobs, supra note 20, at 54; Free Enteiprise Goes Into Space, U.S. NEws & WoRLD
RPP., Sept. 20, 1982, at 12.
24 Marbach & Shapiro, A Giant Step for Capitalism, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1982, at
64; see Free Enterprise Goes Into Space, supra note 23, at 12.
25 Reinhold, Texas Rocket Built on "Shoestring" Carries Free Enterprise Into Space,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1982, at 1, col. 4; see Free Enterprise Goes Into Space, supra note
23 at 12.
2a Free Enterprise Goes Into Space, supra note 23, at 12.
2? Myers, Federal Government Regulation of Commercial Operations Using Expendable
Launch Vehicles, 12J. SPACE L. 40,43 (1984). The FAA regards Part 101, sub-part
C, of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) as the only FARs governing rocket
launches. Part 101, sub-part C, was originally adopted to ensure that small rock-
ets launched by hobbyists and scientists would not endanger air traffic. Id at n.12.
28 Dula, supra note 22, at 181.
2- FINCH & MooRE, supra note 21, at 66.
-o IS at 64. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2278 (1982).
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quiring an export license was to ensure compliance with
applicable international treaties concerning government
liability for private space activity.31 Other agencies were
also involved in the process of reviewing Space Services'
launch proposal. Though they disclaimed any regulatory
authority, NASA played a large role in reviewing the tech-
nical safety of the launch. 2
The third private launch occurred when Starstruck In-
corporated launched its prototype Dolphin rocket on Au-
gust 3, 1984, in the Pacific Ocean off San Clemente
Island.3 3  By the time Starstruck sought launch permis-
sion, the Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(OCST) had been created within the Office of the Secre-
tary of Transportation. OCST provided Starstruck with
the single governmental contact point Space Services did
not have. Therefore, Starsbruck went through a far less
cumbersome process than that of Space Services.
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(OCST), which now administers the Commercial Space
Launch Act, had its origins in the Presidential Space Pol-
icy announced on July 4, 1982.s4 That policy, announced
by President Reagan during ceremonies following the re-
-i Dula, supra note 22, at 180. Articles VI and VII of the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, United States-
United Kingdom-USSR, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, and the Convention
on International Liability For Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972,
United States-United Kingdom-USSR, 24 U.S.T. 2589, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, create a
legal regime of state liability for national activity in outer space. Under this re-
gime the United States government would be responsible for any damage caused
by the Conestoga launch.
s, Dula, supra note 22, at 180. NASA has consistently denied any authority to
regulate commercial launch activity through the National Aeronautics and Space
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2477, 2481-2484 (1982). However, the Act may be read
to give NASA the authority to regulate private launches.
- Starstruck Launches Proto"pe Dolphin Rocket in First Flight, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 13, 1984, at 20. Starstruck has since experienced financial difficulties
and undergone reorganization. Startruck Mulls Land Launching, SPACE Bus. NEws,
Nov. 19, 1984, at 6; Booster Tests, Workforce Cut by Starstruch, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 24, 1984, at 25.
- Remarks on the Completion of the Fourth Mission of the Space Shuttle Co-
lumbia, 18 WEEKLY COMP. Paas. DOC. 869 (July 14, 1982).
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turn of the Shuttle Columbia, was the culmination of a ten
month inter-agency policy review and formulation pro-
cess.35 An important part of the directive coming from
the policy reads: "The United States encourages domestic
commercial exploitation of space capabilities, technology,
and systems for national economic benefit. These activi-
ties must be consistent with national security concerns,
treaties, and international agreements. 3 6
The Space Policy directive created the Senior Inter-
agency Group on Space (SIG-Space), which is chaired by
the Assistant to the President for National Security Af-
fairs.3 7 SIG-Space was created to implement the policies
announced by the President on July 4, 1982.38 Among the
issues addressed by SIG-Space was the commercial space
launch business. SIG-Space's work on that issue resulted
in the Presidential Directive on the Commercialization of
Expendable Launch Vehicles of May 26, 1983.'g The di-
rective states that one of the government's basic goals
should be to "encourage the private sector development
of commercial launch operations.1 40 To help realize this
goal, regulation would be kept to a minimum and govern-
ment facilities would be made available on a reimbursable
basis.4'
35 Id. at 872. The agencies and departments which participated in the policy
review were State, Defense, Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, NASA, the Na-
tional Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget. I, at 875-76.
36 Id. at 873.
- Id. at 875.
S8 Id The other members of SIG-Space are the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Commerce, the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Administrator of NASA. Id
39 FINCH & MooRE, supra note 21, at 56-57.
4o Id at 57.
41 Id. The directive specifically stated:
(1) The government will license, supervise, and regulate commer-
cial ELV operations only to the extent required to meet national and
international obligations and to ensure public safety.
(2) The government will make available on a reimbursable basis fa-
cilities, equipment, tooling, and services required to support the
production and operation of commercial ELVs.
(3) While the government will not subsidize the commercialization
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To implement the objective of the 1983 directive, Presi-
dent Reagan issued Executive Order 12,465 on February
24, 1984.42 This order designated the Department of
Transportation (DOT) as the lead federal agency for en-
couraging and facilitating private commercial ELV activi-
ties.43 To handle this new responsibility, the Secretary of
Transportation, Elizabeth Dole, established the OCST
within the DOT.44 Although the OCST had operated in-
formally since November 16, 1983,4 5 Secretary Dole offi-
cially delegated the duties enumerated in Executive Order
12,465 to the director of the OCST on February 24,
1984.46 The Secretary's order described OCST's primary
responsibility to be the "[f]ocal point within the Federal
government for private sector space launch contacts and
licensing related to commercial expendable launch vehi-
cle operations and for promotion and encouragement of
commercial expendable launch vehicle industry. 47
As the Administration was making progress, Congress
realized the need for an organized policy toward the regu-
lation of private launch activities and took steps to codify
the policy and administrative developments discussed
above. Congress enacted, and sent to President Reagan,
the Commercial Space Launch Act, partially in the hope
that a change in administrations would not result in a
modification of the steps already taken toward ELV regu-
of ELVs, it will price the use of its facilities, equipment, and services
consistent with the goal of encouraging viable commercial ELV
launch activity.
(4) The government will review and approve any proposed commer-
cial launch facility and range as well as subsequent operations con-
ducted therefrom. Near-term demonstration or test flights of
commercial launch vehides conducted from other than a U.S. gov-
ernment national range will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis us-
ing existing licensing authority and procedures.
42 Exec. Order No. 12,465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7211 (1984).
43 l at § 1.
44 50 Fed. Reg. 7782 (1985) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1.22(a)).
'5 Myers, supra note 27, at 4243.
41 50 Fed. Reg. 7782 (1985) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1.68).
47 Id
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lation 8 After enactment on October 10, 1984, Secretary
Dole delegated the responsibilities given DOT by the
Commercial Space Launch Act to the OCST.49
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT
Space Services' experience with the jungle of regula-
tions and agencies which might govern private launch ac-
tivities demonstrated the need to design a better system.50
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 is Congress'
response to that need.5 ' The following discussion is an
outline and analysis of the Act's provisions and the regu-
lations promulgated to implement the Act.
A. Persons and Activities Covered
Section 2605 of the Act prohibits the launch of a
"launch vehicle" or operation of a launch site by any per-
son within the United States or any United States citizens
outside of the United States unless authorized by a license
issued under the Act.52 A "launch vehicle" is defined in
section 2603(6) as "any vehicle constructed for the pur-
pose of operating in, or placing a payload in, outer space
and any suborbital rocket." 53 This definition appears to
bring expendable launch vehicles and reuseable launch
vehicles within the Act's coverage. By design, however,
the definition does not include upper stages.-4 Congress
intentionally left the licensing of upper stages to later
48 S. REP. No. 656, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5328, 5329 [hereinafter Senate Report 656].
,1 50 Fed. Reg. 9036 (1985) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1.68).
Senator Paul S. Trible, in his opening statement to hearings on the Commer-
cial Space Launch Act, estimated that the regulatory jungle may include as many
as eighteen federal agencies and twenty-two statutes. To Facilitate Certain Space
Launches, and for Other Purposes, 1984: Hearings on S. 2931 Before the Subcomm. on
Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984).
"I The Commercial Space Launch Act, 49 U.S.C. § 2601 (Supp. 11 1984).
11 49 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
-3Id at § 2603(b).
An upper stage is essentially a rocket engine intended to elevate a payload
from a low earth orbit to a higher earth orbit.
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consideration, reasoning that the role and capabilities of
upper stages are presently too uncertain to address.
The Act does, not give the DOT licensing authority over
the payloads aboard a launch vehicle. A launch license
holder, however, must comply with all regulations and
laws applicable to the payload before deployment.55 If a
license or permit is required for the payload, the DOT
need only ascertain that the operator obtained a license. 56
When a payload licensing scheme does not cover a pro-
posed payload, the DOT has the responsibility to assess
the potential for harm to the public, property, national se-
curity, or foreign policy interests of the United States and,
if necessary, to prevent the launch.5 7
The term "payload" is defined as "an object which a
person undertakes to place in outer space by means of a
launch vehicle, and includes subcomponents of the launch
vehicle specifically designed or adapted for that object."58
Under this definition, the OCST has found only two types
of payloads exclusively licensed by other federal agencies:
telecommunications satellites by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission and remote sensing satellites by the
Department of Commerce.59 However, "payload" might
include passengers or passenger modules. Because a pas-
senger module would necessarily return to earth, it might
constitute a re-entry vehicle meeting the Federal Aviation
Act's definition of an aircraft and thereby implicate the li-
censing authority of the Federal Aviation Administration.
Therefore, in the future, when commercial space tourism
begins, the FAA conceivably may need to issue an airwor-
thiness certificate for payloads designed and "intended to
be used for flight in the air."' 60 The FAA more likely will
not become involved in regulating combination space-air-
- See id at § 2605(b)(1) (Supp. 111984).
"See id
s, Id at § 2605(b)(2).
"Id at § 2603(0.
51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6875 (1986)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. ch. 111).
'o The FAA issues airworthiness certificates pursuant to 49 U.S.C. app. § 1424
(1982) and 14 C.F.R. pt. 3 (1986). An "aircraft" is defined by the FAA as "a
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craft vehicles as it did with the space shuttle.6' This would
leave regulation of passenger carrying space-aircraft to
the OCST. 2
Section 2606 of the Act brings launch sites under the
DOT's control.63  The OCST is now responsible for the
licensing of all aspects of a private launch site except ra-
dio communications. The FCC retains authority over use
of the radio spectrum."' Although the OCST has devel-
oped some regulations to cover the licensing of launch
sites, it believes that more investigation and regulations
will be needed. 3
Because the United States bears international responsi-
bility for the activities of its nationals in outer space under
Article Six of the Outer Space Treaty6 6 and for damages
caused by space objects launched from within its territory
under the Liability Convention,6 7 a launch license is re-
quired for all launches by United States citizens and for all
launches from within the United States.68  Launch activi-
ties of the United States government are exempt from the
Act.6 9 A "United States citizen" includes all citizens, busi-
device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air." 14 C.F.R. § 1.1
(1986).
61 In a March 11, 1977 letter the Chief Counsel of the FAA concluded the shut-
tle is not an aircraft "for purposes of the FAAct respecting applicability of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)." Mossinghoff & Sloup, Legal Issues Inherent
in Space Shuttle Operation, 6J. SPACE L. 47, 65-66 (1978).
62 For a discussion of the review process for payloads to be launched, see infra
notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
6s See 49 U.S.C. § 2606 (Supp. 11 1984).
See id. at § 2605(c)(2).
0. 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6873 (1986)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. ch. I11).
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, United States-United Kingdom-USSR, art. VI, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No.
6347 (providing that signatory states bear international responsiblity for national
activities in outer space whether conducted by governmental or non-governmen-
tal entities).
01 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, United States-United Kingdom-USSR, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S.
No. 7762 (imposing liability on signatory states for damages caused by space ob-
jects launched by non-governmental entities).
49 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
". See SENATE REPORT 656, supra note 48, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWs 5328, 5330.
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ness entities organized in the United States, and foreign
corporations controlled by United States citizens or busi-
ness entities.70 The license requirement for citizens ap-
plies equally to launches from within and from without
the United States.7' While the only near-term private
launches will likely be commercial in nature, the Commer-
cial Space Launch Act applies equally to "not for profit"
launches such as a university research launch.7 2
B. The Office of Commercial Space Transportation
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation, oper-
ating informally since 1983, was officially delegated the
responsibility of administering the Commercial Space
Launch Act on October 30, 1984.3 Its director is author-
ized to exercise all the authorities given to the Secretary
of Transportation by the Commercial Space Launch Act.74
The OCST's primary duty is the licensing of activity re-
lated to commercial space transportation. The Act, how-
ever, gives the OCST additional responsibilities and
authority. These duties include monitoring and enforce-
ment of the Act's provisions as well as oversight of the use
of government equipment and facilities.
Section 2616 of the Act gives the OCST the authority to
investigate activities covered by the Act's provisions.75
70 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 2603(11) (Supp. 11 1984).
1 See i. at § 2605(a). Section 2605(a) generally requires a license for all
launches within the United States and for all launches by United States citizens
outside the United States. Id
72 See SENATE REPORT 656, supra note 48, at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5328, 5335.
- 50 Fed. Reg. 9036 (1985) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1).
- 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6872 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 401.3).
Ts 49 U.S.C. § 2616(b) (Supp. 111984). This section allows any employee of the
DOT to
enter at any reasonable time any launch site, production facility, or
assembly site of a launch vehicle, or any site where a payload is inte-
grated with a launch vehicle, for the purpose of inspecting any ob-
ject which is subject to this chapter and any records or reports
required by the Secretary to be made or kept under this chapter....
Id at § 2616(b)(2)(A).
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Section 2617 makes violation of the Act unlawful, 6 and
section 2618 imposes civil penalties for such violations."
Section 2613 of the Act and section 405.1 of the regula-
tions allow the OCST to monitor licensed activity.7 8 Such
monitoring does not violate the fourth amendment search
warrant requirement because, as discussed in Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States,7 9 a businessman who engages in a
pervasively regulated activity impliedly consents to war-
rantless searches. 80
Section 2614 directs the OCST to sell extra and unnec-
essary government launch equipment.8 ' The agency pos-
sessing the equipment sets the price for the equipment,
but in no circumstances may the agency set the price be-
low the fair market value. 2 In the case of launch services,
the cost must be the direct cost incurred by the govern-
ment.8 3 These provisions are important in the develop-
ment of a private launch industry because the expense of
constructing a launch facility will force private launch
companies to use existing government facilities. In the
wake of the Reagan Administration's new shuttle policy,
however, one of the uncertainties facing the private
launch industry is the lack of a policy on use of govern-
ment-owned launch facilities.84 Section 2614 appears to
place the responsibility of such policy formation with the
76 Id. at § 2617.
77 Id at § 2618(a). This section provides up to a $100,000 fine for each viola-
tion. Each day of a continuing violation constitutes a separate violation. The Sec-
retary assesses the penalty by written notice. Id.
78 Id. at § 2613; 51 Fed. Reg. 6,870 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 405.1).
7- 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
8o Id. at 271. Almeida-Sanchez involved the warrantless search of a motor vehicle
near the United States-Mexico border. Id at 276. The Court distinguished the
case from searches in federally licensed and regulated industries, stating "when a
dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a
federal license, he does so with the knowledge that this business... will be subject
to effective inspection." Id at 27"1 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316 (1972)).
-- 49 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
a2 Id. at § 2614(b)(1).
Foley, supra note 9, at 22.
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OCST. Without a launch facility pricing policy, the pri-
vate launch industry will face another development delay.
C. License Application Process
Before a vehicle may be launched, the OCST must issue
a license.85 Before the OCST will issue a license for an
unmanned launch, the applicant must obtain mission and
safety approval.86 This bifurcated licensing process al-
lows the government to effectively review its two major
areas of concern and allows an applicant to receive ap-
proval of certain matters during the planning stages of a
launch.8 7 A license will contain the conditions an appli-
cant must meet before launching. Failure to comply with
those conditions will result in disapproval of the license
application. 8 The OCST has diagrammed the licensing
procedure as follows:89 [see diagram on following page]
1. Safety Review
The safety review process leads to "safety approval,"
one of the two "approvals" necessary for obtaining a li-
cense. The process is designed to ensure that a proposed
launch and any accompanying payloads do not endanger
public safety.90 If the vehicle is to be launched from a fed-
erally operated range or a site operated under a licence
issued by the OCST, the safety review process is rather
short. In most instances safety approval will be given
when the proposed launch has been accepted by a range
or launch site capable of handling the launch.91 The
OGST will then condition the license upon compliance
with the range or site operation regulations.92 This pre-
sumption of safety afforded federal ranges and licensed
as 49 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(1) (Supp. II 1984).
so 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6875 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.5).
8I at 6873 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 411.3).
-8Id at 6875 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.9).
89 50 Fed. Reg. 7714, 7716 (1985).
51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6881 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.11).
I at 6879 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 411.5).
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private sites operates under the assumption that the
ranges and sites conform to general standards for loca-
tion, operation procedures, personnel qualifications, and
equipment quality.93
If, however, the launch is to take place from a site not
already licensed, the safety process is long and compli-
cated.94 Because launch site safety standards or require-
ments have not yet been developed, the OCST will treat
each launch site license application on a case-by-case ba-
sis.95 Existing regulations governing a proposed launch
from an unlicensed launch site require the applicant to
submit detailed information designed to check for a safe
site location, proper operating procedures, qualified per-
sonnel, and adequate equipment. 96 The safety review
process will also examine the payloads accompanying the
launch vehicle.97 If the payload is a communication satel-
lite or a remote sensing satellite, the OCST, will for safety
review purposes, initially determine whether a license has
been issued by the Federal Communications Commission
or the Commerce Department,"8 respectively. If no fed-
eral agency has licensed the payload, the OCST must then
ensure that the payload will not jeopardize public safety.99
9 It at 6880-82, (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.13).
4Id at 6875. The applicant proposing to launch must demonstrate that it pos-
sesses the capability and resources for safely conducting the preparation and
launch of a launch vehide and any accompanying payloads. Id at 6879 (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. § 411.5).
, Id at 6874. The OCST is developing regulations to cover commercial launch
site operations. Id at 6879 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 411.3).
Id at 6870, 6881-82 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.17).
97 For a definition of the term "payload," see text accompnaying note 58 supra.
-See 49 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1) (Supp. 111984); see also supra note 59 and accom-
panying text.
49 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(2) (Supp. 111984). While the Commercial Launch Act
grants the DOT authority to prevent a launch if the payload will endanger public
safety, the information which must be reported as part of the safety review for
launches from licensed sites does not indude payload information. See 51 Fed.
Reg. 6870, 6882-83 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 415.17, 415.25). The
mission review reporting requirements probably cover this technical flaw.
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2. Mission Review
The mission review process focuses primarily on the
payload to be launched. 00 If another agency is responsi-
ble for licensing a payload, the OCST need only ascertain
that such an agency has issued a license, and the mission
review process for the payload ends. 1'0 When no licens-
ing process otherwise exists, the OCST, in consultation
with the Department of Defense and the Department of
State, will examine any "national security interests" and
"foreign policy interests or obligations of the United
States" a proposed payload launch may present.10 2
Consultation with the Department of State, it is hoped,
will ensure United States compliance with international
agreements and spot potential foreign policy complica-
tions.'0 3 For instance, the obligations created by interna-
tional agreements include the liability provisions placed
upon the United States for damage caused by private
space activity. °4 A foreign policy consideration may en-
,oo 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6882-83 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 415.21,
411.7).
49 U.S.C. §§ 2605(b)(1), 2605(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
Section 2619 of the Commercial Space Launch Act requires the DOT to
consult with the Department of Defense and the Department of State. Specifically,
section 2619 provides as follows:
(a) Matters of national defense
The Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of Defense on all
matters, including the issuance of transfer of each license, under this
chapter affecting national security. The Secretary of Defense shall
be responsible for identifying and notifying the Secretary of those
national security interests of the United States which are relevant to
activities under this chapter.
(b) Matters of foreign policy
The Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of State on all mat-
ters, including the issuance or transfer of each license, under this
chapter affecting foreign policy. The Secretary of State shall be re-
sponsible for identifying and notifying the Secretary of those foreign
policy interests or obligations of the United States which are rele-
vant to activities under this chapter.
51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6879 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 411.7(b)) makes
these consultations part of the mission review process.
- Notice of Policy and Request for Comments, 50 Fed. Reg. 7714, 7717
(1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. ch. 11).
104 See, e.g., Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
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compass possible interference with another nation's use
of space.
The OCST's consultation with the Department of De-
fense involves different concerns. Namely, the objective is
to recognize issues in the area of national security. A na-
tional security concern, for example, would include
preventing a collision between the proposed payload and
a classified Department of Defense satellite.
An applicant may go through the safety review process
before or after the mission review process.105 Also, the
OCST encourages informal inquiries by applicants to
avoid later difficulties.106 Once a formal application is
filed, the OCST must make a determination within 180
days.107 During the application process the OCST, not
the applicant, has the duty of shepherding the application
through the licensing process. 08 After the licensing pro-
cess has been navigated once, the OCST hopes to avoid de
novo application reviews for repeat or similar license
applications. 109
While the licensing process designed by the OCST is a
good start, several aspects of the scheme will have to be
altered as the need for launch licenses increases. First,
when private ELV launches become frequent, particularly
when reusable launch vehicles are in operation, the mis-
sion review process could become burdensome. 110 Sec-
ond, while the safety review process likely will develop
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, United States-United Kingdom-USSR, art. II, 24 U.S.T.
2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762.
los 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6879 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 411.3(a)).
-" Id at 6880 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 413.3).
107 49 U.S.C. § 2608(b) (Supp. 111984). If the OCST has not made a determi-
nation within 120 days after receipt of the application, the OCST must inform the
applicant of any pending issues and of actions required to resolve those issues. I&
t- 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6874, 6880 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 413.9).
too Id at 6880 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 413.9).
'to The Center for Space Policy, in its market forecast for space transportation,
anticipates the private operation of two space shuttles. A Market Forecast, supra
note 8, at 143. The likelihood of privately operated space shuttles has been in-
creased by the Reagan Administration's decision to build a fourth shuttle. With
the assembly line activated for a fourth shuttle, the cost of a privately financed
shuttle will be reduced.
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published technical standards accessible to all, the yard-
stick used in the mission review process, namely the "na-
tional security interests" or "foreign policy interests and
obligations" of the United States,"11 is too open-ended for
advanced mission planning in some instances. The con-
stantly changing definitions of "national security inter-
ests" and "foreign policy interests and obligations" may
make the advanced planning necessary for space activity
very difficult. For example, a joint venture in materials
processing between a United States firm and a foreign
firm may be acceptable one year, but may run afoul of na-
tional security or foreign policy interests the next year be-
cause the foreign firm may come from a now unfriendly
country. An applicant could obtain mission approval
early in a project,' 2 but find that mission approval with-
drawn when the time comes for issuance of the final li-
cense. 1 3  Such reliance could result in substantial
losses. 1 4 The uncertainty created by the vague terms
"national security interests" and "foreign policy interests
and obligations" could chill investment in private space
activity. Unambiguous criteria and guarantees of contin-
ued acceptance and validity need to be put into the mis-
sion review process.
D. Application and License Requirements
Because the licensing process is untested and the pri-
vate launch industry is undeveloped, the requirements an
applicant must satisfy are presently only general in nature.
Knowing this, the OCST is encouraging potential appli-
"' See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
I2 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6879 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 411.3(a)).
,,s While the introductory note to the regulations published in the Federal Reg-
ister states that an advanced mission approval will be made part of the record and
remain valid, the note later states that the OCST will review a previous approval
when significant or substantial changes occur. Id at 6875.
"14 Though the equities of such a scenario would weigh in favor of the license
applicant, a license or aspect of a license does not create a vested right capable of
being "taken" for constitutional purposes. O'Connor v. Superior Court, 90 Cal.
App. 3d 107, 153 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1979). See also 51 AM.JUR. 2D Licenses and Permits
§ 18 (1970).
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cants to informally consult with OCST before applying for
a license to determine specific license requirements.1 5
The existing license requirements can be separated ac-
cording to the bifurcated licensing process discussed in
the preceding section.
1. Safety Review
While the OCST is responsible for licensing both indi-
vidual launches and private launch sites, the OCST has
not yet developed safety standards for private launch
sites' 1 6 and manned launches."17 The existing regulations
which do touch upon site safety do so indirectly. If an
applicant for a one-time (single) launch license intends to
use an unlicensed launch site, the applicant must provide
a great deal more information than if a government facil-
ity or licensed launch site were used.' 18 Until specific site
standards are developed, the OCST will handle the cur-
rent site license inquiries on a case-by-case basis."19
When an individual launch license application is filed,
the OCST determines whether the applicant can safely
launch a proposed payload.' 20 The OCST examines four
areas of concern: site location safety, operating proce-
dures adequacy, personnel qualifications, and equipment
adequacy.' 2 1 In most cases, when the launch is to occur at
a federal range, the four safety areas of concern are satis-
fied by a statement verifying that the range operator has
accepted the launch and listing the parties responsible for
conducting all parts of the launch operations.122 At this
- 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6874 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. ch. 111).
,-i Id. at 6873-74.
'*1 The OCST intends to specifically address manned flight in the future. Id at
6873.
,, I's at 6875 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.17).
310 Id at 6873-74. Part of the case-by-case review of a site license application
will include matters of radio frequency access. The Commercial Space Launch
Act preserves the FCC's authority in this area. 49 U.S.C. §§ 2605(c)(2),
2607(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
12o 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6875 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.13).
121 I
122 Ii (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.17).
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point in the development of its regulations, the OCST is
relying heavily upon the technical expertise of the federal
range operators.
The Commercial Space Launch Act does not supersede
or repeal any existing federal statutes or regulations di-
rectly applicable to private launches.123  So far, though,
only federal aviation regulations governing unmanned
rocket activity,' 24 the FCC's authority to license communi-
cation satellites, 25 and the Department of Commerce's
authority to license remote sensing satellites 12 6 have been
found directly applicable. 2 7 Therefore, during the safety
review process, except for those three areas, the OCST is
entirely responsible for protecting the public's safety.1 28
Except for the licensing authority of the the FCC and De-
partment of Commerce, however, the OCST may waive
an existing federal statute or regulation if that waiver
would be in the public interest and would not jeopardize
public safety, public property, or foreign policy
interests. 1 2 9
13 See SENATE REPORT 656, supra note 48, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 5330. The Commercial Space Launch Act specifically
exempts launch vehicles and payloads from export control acts. 49 U.S.C.§ 2620(b) (Supp. I 1984). Although export laws are of questionable application,
the Department of State used the Arms Export Control Act to obtain authority
over Space Services' launch of the Conestoga I in 1982. Dula, supra note 22, at
180.
124 14 C.F.R. §§ 101.21-.25 (1986). The FAA and OCST have agreed that the
OCST will administer the requirements of 14 C.F.R. §§ 101.21-.25. See 51 Fed.
Reg. 6870, 6873 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. ch. 111).
12- Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
120 Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201-
4292 (Supp. III 1985).
127 The licensing authority of the FCC and Commerce Department is specifi-
cally exempted from the DOT's authority under the Commercial Space Launch
Act. 49 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(2) (Supp. I 1984).
12, Part of the OCST's responsibility includes assessing the environmental im-
pact of a launch according to the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act. 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6876 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 514.41).
- 49 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(2) (Supp. 111986); 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6872-73 (1986)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 404.3).
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2. Mission Safety
The mission review process is intended to protect the
"public health and safety, the safety of property, and the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States .... ,10 To perform-this function the OCST re-
quires that an applicant supply information for each of
three areas-launch plan, payload operation, and financial
responsibility. Launch plan information includes a de-
scription of the launch vehicle, a flight plan, and a list of
unique hazards that might be posed by the launch or re-
entry.5 1 Payload operation information includes the na-
ture and ownership of the payload. 5 2 If the payload is
not licensed by the FCC or the Department of Commerce,
the information requirements expand to include an as-
sessment of safety issues, the payload's design, and the
payload's proposed orbit.155 The required financial re-
sponsibility information includes either evidence of com-
mercial third-party liability coverage or evidence of the
purchase of a commercial surety bond.5 4 The OCST de-
termines the amount of insurance coverage or the amount
of the bond. 55
As mentioned earlier, the Commercial Space Launch
Act requires that the Departments of Defense and State
assist the OCST in evaluating the information submitted
for the mission review process.5 8 While disagreements
among the three agencies are not likely, the vagueness of
the criteria, "national security interests" and "foreign pol-
icy interests and obligations,"' 5 7 will lead to some differ-
ent conclusions. The possibility of different conclusions
Iso 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6883 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.27). See
also id. at 6879 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 411.7(a)).
13 IA at 6875 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.25).
,32 Id (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.25(e)).
1s 51 Fed. Reg. 6883 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.27).
-5 50 Fed. Reg. 19,280, 19,281 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. ch. 111).
,5 49 U.S.C. § 2614(c) (Supp. H 1984).
,so See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
.3, See 49 U.S.C. § 2619(a),(b) (Supp. I 1984); supra note 102 and accompany-
ing text.
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has raised questions such as: Whose conclusion must pre-
vail? Who is responsible for arbitrating a disputed mis-
sion review conclusion? So far, the OCST's response to
these questions has been unclear and evasive. For exam-
ple, the OCST recently stated, "[i]n the unlikely event of a
genuinely irreconcilable disagreement between the De-
partment [of Transportation] and either of these agen-
cies, the issue would be resolved in the same manner as
any such matter is handled...: Through appropriate dis-
cussions within the Executive Branch."' 38 A reasonable
interpretation of this response is that the White House
will have the final say on disputed matters of national se-
curity and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the potential de-
lay and uncertainty created by this unstructured
consultation scheme is bound to impede the development
of a private launch industry and an efficient regulatory
regime.
E. The Sale of Launch Equipment and Services
Section 2614 of the Commercial Space Launch Act re-
quires the OCST to "facilitate and encourage" the private
sector in acquiring excess government launch property
and services.15 9 While the Senate report on the Act ex-
plains that the OCST's role is only to ensure pricing that
will encourage the commercial launch industry, the Act is
not intented to alter any agency's existing authority.140
Therefore, the OCST's role in selling government launch
property and services is unclear. Much of this uncertainty
comes from the tone of the Act. For example, section
1- 51 Fed. Reg. 6870, 6872 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. ch. 111).
,0 49 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (Supp. 11 1984). Section 2614(a) provides as follows:
The Secretary shall take such actions as may be necessary to facili-
tate and encourage the acquisition (by lease, sale, transaction in Lieu
of Sale, or otherwise) by the private sector of launch property of the
United States which is excess or is otherwise not needed for public
use and of launch services, including utilities, of the United States
which are otherwise not needed for public use.Id.
140 SENATE REPORT 656, supra note 48, at 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS, at 5342.
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2614 appears to appoint the OCST as a marketing agent
for government launch property and services.1 4 1 Some of
the uncertainty, however, comes from the Reagan Admin-
istration's indecisive limits on NASA's commercial activ-
ity.142 Only the Administration can straighten out this
confusion.
Section 2614 also establishes pricing guidelines. 43 All
sales should guarantee a reasonable return to the federal
government and provide no direct subsidies. 44 In light of
the cost barriers and international competition faced by
private launch service providers, this policy might have to
be re-evaluated. In some manner or another the United
States shuttle, French Ariane, and Soviet Union commer-
cial launches have received government subsidies. To be
competitive, the United States private launch industry
may need access to low cost government launch services.
III. EVALUATION
The Gommercial Space Launch Act is a good start for
the development of a viable private launch industry in the
United States. It creates the framework for developing a
workable regulating bureaucracy. Without immediate ac-
tion to keep the momentum going, however, the objective
of developing a viable private launch industry will be in
danger.
In the short run, five specific steps should be taken.
First, the OGST should have its own personnel capable of
dealing with the technology of space transportation,
rather than relying on consultation with NASA or other
agencies. t4  When the OCST must rely upon NASA or
the Air Force for technical advice during the safety review
141 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
'43 See 49 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(1) (Supp. I 1984).
'4 See id; SENATE REPORT 656, supra note 48, at 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. Naws, at 5342.
1-s For a further discussion of the problems caused by lack of technically trained
personnel in the OCST, see Management of Commercial Space Transportation Ofice May
Be Reorganized, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 29, 1986, at 16.
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process, three potential problems could develop. First,
paper shuffling between agencies and NASA personnel's
inability to respond immediately to requests from the
OCST would delay the licensing process. Second, be-
cause the line of communication between technical per-
sonnel and the decision makers would be long and
structured, the quality of communication and, thus, the
quality of the decision would be adversely affected.
Third, NASA, the Air Force, and any other agency in-
volved have their own turfs to protect, which perhaps
would color their advice.
The second step which should be taken in the short run
is the promulgation of some minimum technical safety
standards. With known minimum standards in place, com-
mon industry practices could be developed. Common in-
dustry practices would take some of the uncertainty out of
the regulatory process and reduce the time and effort re-
quired for obtaining a license.
The third step, similar to the second step, should be the
promulgation of specific criteria or standards to be used
when identifying "national security interests" or "foreign
policy interests or obligations of the United States" 146
during the mission review process. The publication of at
least minimum standards would help to stabilize the pri-
vate launch industry and streamline the license applica-
tion process. These minimum standards would be helpful
even if they were subject to change during the mission re-
view process.
Fourth, when mission approval is given before the final
license is issued, the OCST should be forbidden from
withdrawing mission approval for political reasons unre-
lated to safety. Alternatively, if mission approval is with-
drawn for political reasons unrelated to safety, the license
applicant should be compensated for lost investment or
revenue. As discussed earlier in the license application
process section, the financial uncertainty created by the
,40 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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ambiguous and ever-changing notion of "national secur-
ity interests" or "foreign policy interests and obligations
of the United States" will restrain the development of a
private space transportation industry.1'4 7 Reimbursement
not only would eliminate financial uncertainty, but also
would prevent the OCST from withdrawing mission ap-
proval for trivial matters.
The fifth short run step which should be taken is the
creation of an environment conducive to the development
of a private space transportation industry. Such a step
would involve political decisions as well as modification of
the existing legal regime. For example, the Administra-
tion and NASA should announce a firm policy on NASA's
future commercial activity. Further, to cover assembly
line start-up costs, a guaranteed market for expendable
launch vehicles, probably through military contracts,
should be created. Finally, to create some certainty, a pol-
icy governing access to government launch facilities and
charges for facility use should be enacted.
In the long run, streamlining the entire regulatory sys-
tem will be necessary. As the launch of ELVs becomes a
regular occurrence, and particularly when a space shuttle
system or hypersonic space plane is privately operated, a
very quick, if not automatic, licensing process will be
needed. A one-time licensing of the operator with contin-
ued oversight by the government, similar to the system
used to regulate private airlines, might be best.
While this one-time licensing scheme may appear to ig-
nore some of the governmental obligations to monitor
private space activity created by the Outer Space Treaty1 48
and the Liability Convention,1 49 sufficient procedures to
meet those obligations can be created. Just as the United
States establishes airworthiness standards for United
States registered aircraft engaged in international
147 See supra notes I 11-114, 136-188 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
14' See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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flight,' -50 the United States could establish spaceworthi-
ness standards for space transportation systems. Such
spaceworthiness standards would cover the safety review
process concerns.
Further, to monitor private space activity, a route ap-
proval or flight plan filing system similar to that used in
the airline industry could be established for space trans-
portation. Such a system would be activated when a space
transporter filed a flight plan with a launch site operator.
The launch site operator would first check the flight plan
for compliance with federally established flight regula-
tions (including nonpermitted space activity). The launch
site operator would then clear the flight plan with a na-
tional, and even possibly an international, space flight
control center.
As the call for a national and an international space
flight control center suggests, the long run efficient regu-
lation of private and governmental space transportation
will require the creation of an international space agency.
An organization similar to the International Civil Aviation
Organization, but modified to meet the needs of space
technology, must be created. Some of the matters an in-
ternational space agency must address include the control
of space traffic, the promulgation of rules of the road for
space, protection of the space and earth environment,' 5'
and the prevention of armed conflict in space. While the
Commercial Space Launch Act provides a good beginning
for regulating private space activity on a national level, an
effective structure for regulating private and governmen-
I- Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 31, 61 Stat. (2)
1180, 1189, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 952, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 316. Artide 31 provides as
follows: "Every aircraft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with
a certificate of airworthiness issued or rendered valid by the State in which it is
registered." Id
is' An example of the threat posed to the space and the earth environment is
the more than four dozen radioactive satellites now in an orbit of about 1000
kilometers. According to a study conducted by Nicholas L. Johnson, these four
dozen satellites carry over a metric ton of highly enriched uranium-235 and pluto-
nium-238. Radioactive Space Debris Study Cites Hazards to Satellites, Earth, Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Sept. 22, 1986, at 19.
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tal space activity must reflect the international nature of
the space medium. If space activity regulation does not
move beyond the national level, the peaceful exploration
of space for all of mankind will not be realized.
.1

Comments

